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inter~:st

Finding solutions to conflict of
is a never ending task.,
the

another.

'I'he ba.sic difficulty :revoJ.es around

situation

fZ:-iCt

situations

,.,
J·..a

What :m.ay be statutory

not be relief for another.

r<:~lief

for

onE~,

situation way

'I'his paper attenpts to (:::2rnr•1i:ne

the possibility of statutory relief and pre<:-;ents certain
selected

exau1pl.s~]

of federal and state leV<3l legislation in

the:;; confl:i.ct of interest. are,a.

WE!

be,gin with a 9eneral

with an evalu<.:i:tion of certa.Ln. federal eind state responsH·2'a tc,

conflict of interest situations.
H.eco,;;ni:dng that it wculd be much too involved to
p:cesent all

fed~~ral

conflict of ir: t0rest. legislation and
1

also a state-by-state analysis, I ha11e chosen to f'Jelect cc::r:tain. key federal legislation and certain

i~<.~YJ.ple

·states whose

conflict of i.nterest leg is la ti.on has been UDed as a

Jerr:H3Y and M:i.nnegota

ar~:-:

rn-:.::;·~~"'~1

by

cons.idexed by various studies .in

tbs conflict area to 1121.ve th;;; most complete statutory :t'E:lief
for conflict of interest. s:'<. tuntion;;.

v

The selected states

also were chosen because of their gE::ographic loc.;;.tion and
bf.;cause each of them has a some-what sirttilar approac~t to 4g;;1-

flict of .inh:rest..

I attf·}xrtpt to

catogorizc~

different kinds

of conflict si tuation.s a.nd proceed to presE;nt some selected
legislation a.nd proposed legislation that is us6d to remE.;dy

tb2se situatiorrn

govcr.nmento

E<.t

c~f

both the national and state level.s

Research success has been somewhat elusive .in

the sense that there are no clearly stated responses to
"grsy-zone" conflict

situations·~

However, we hc.-ITe di::>covered

that the conflict situations, oncE:. defined, can be dealt with
in v·arious ways and can be rE-m1edicd in most cases through
sta.tutory or non-statutory relief.

Preparing this paper has been a long and arduous task.
Much has been written and said

t~bout

conflict of .interest.

Through it all I have somehov-1 mainta.ined a sincere interest

in the subject matter.

I would like to Empress my thanks

to all those who have helped me with this project.
their generous assistance made this

projc~ct

Only

pos.sible.

11

speci.al thanks goes to Professor Arthur Gunlicks for in-·.
spi.ring and sustalning my interest in the conflict of

Vi

in~·

CBAPTER I
!N1rRODUCTION
.'?l.

Standards of H<::"havior

'l'he question of wrwt con:::d::.itutes appropriate behavior

for government officials has long bee.n of grea.t intsrest to
lawyers, persons in gcvernr:i.<::nt, a:r;.d political scientists o

The essential issue is that of ascertaining what is the
!i

good behavior" that is expected of public s2r1:ants a.nd, in

addition, what are appropriate standa.rds that can be used to
evaluate thf::! performance of a public official in a si.tuatio:::.
involving a conflict of interest.
Conflict of interei.:it ho.s bec;;n defined in rn.any ways.
The Uniteu States Supreme court defines tJonf lict of interc',:;;t

or corruption in the following- way.

•:conflict of interest

involves an act of an official or fiduciary person who unlaw-

fully and wrong-fully uses his station or charactGr to procure
soro.e benefit. for hi1m;;elf or for another person, contrary to

duty and the righbJ of others. " 1

r.:.lack 's La,w Dictiona.ry con-

---·----·---1 r1.,. ) • !:i.
"'

'ffo...{.

J OtJ.J.l.b
•.. .,., ~o~ T ./.,"'<'....,,
,,.)_f;' • 682
-' '
•_j,J.

{c•"''. ~.
""

"l""\..:..

i~J.

,.

v. Murchison, 66F. 719 (c .. c. Ga .. , 1934); U.S.
43F.67 (o.c. Ga .. , 1961).

..L
... 0
.:I 6"E)
' ,,

Vo

• 1hwoJ···~,
... ~,rr.. i.
~· i"...:,)l.J.·.:.4',

j

1

Edwards,

tains a similar but so11\e'what briefer definition.

n.l,s>.ck

stat.es that conflict. of int.crest is an act done. wit:h. an intent
iw:~onsi.st.\u1t

to give some advantage
the rights of others .. 2

for this discussion ..

with. official ilut.y a.nd

Thefle defin.i.tions at:n:ve a.s

However,

w~

tl

basis

mustrecog-niza,that there

are various shades of conflict of i11tereat t.o wl1ich we :now

turn our attention ..
Wbat is the problem. of confli<::t of interest as it.
affects goverm,lent?

It

embrao<~a

ficials and. thdS concept of the

11

th-t-:i behavior of public of ...

public i:nterest. .. M

It is

concerned. with whether of.Eicial behavior is consistent with

cial *s conduct. of hi$ job in acoo:rd.fance with the broad in·...

tooth~

and behavior that i.s obviously irr,,proper and illegal,

2nenry Campbell E~lack, Black• a J:raw' Dictiotu:rryi ih.~:f.i-·
nitions of the TerxrtS lu1d J.?hx;ases of American and Fi:i9lish
Jurisprudence 1mcchent. and Mod.ern (St .. Paul, Min.n .. ! Wt::i.st

Publishina"

co •..

1968), 172.

3Martin M.a.Mnllen, ~A Thoery of Corruption., ~
Soci.oloqical R~v:tew, :ex July (1971), 71 ..

---·-"""""'"'"""'"""''"""""'·"""-...,.~""'"-~,.,.,.~

......,.

poaiti.en \ih$ro h:ia p11u.·aonal

01:- priva.t~ inter.aat.i~

his pl.':lhlic dutiQ:si ood r~ap.o.t&:l"ii1ihiJ.1.t.ie5,. 4

aaalin~ \ti th

proi~ar•

soni:~-.

~ctd.vit.ia~

tb~

aci11.ni® of the

as •p:copl!hrt!I or «im(>,

In

decision""'l!~aker

of

or the 9'encral tnii;lic.,

d~mooratic a.Iid res~)onsible

.govern-

!tit~ m:.lnaept of dan1oor~tto and responsible gow:ct1m~1mt

pr(Susuppoi1S•~u~

that

e4XUa!.lly; that all

p~rsonu

dealing with 9ovem·.rn.1;e;nt be treated

l't'OS~estJ,

in

theol!}~

at

l~Mt., ~~iual

t.o govorrn.ient; tha.t all il'.tt:o affordud equal

'*th~

to

f intil.l decidin9 factor r,my h'st1lOl'i};.!il th4l oon•..

d~~1tal p~uwr.pt.ion

that al.l

~tten1p•ting

either g,;;ni11<rim:.tll)" al'.° in individual $i tuations

r.tot..-m case a

t.i@nt ... 5

It eru10~'.l:iaszit1s u.

ecmt:lie·t. gf i:ntereHat <.leviitl.O};!IB in

catalogue $Uch u9ray

ala...~h with

rect~i ve

h~1$.rings, rul<l

deciaious .by g-ov1u:nmer1t based

mer.its" of a pnrt;.;ioular east!!.

is not. t:xp.e-ct.ed tiQ sbo'll>r

favo.:rit:l~un

aooas$

or, sill"tply,

~olely

upon

gOV'.l.~rt1mant:

in t:t:·eating its

~iti2-en.f!f.

4aia.rle·• P~ray, "~he CJ!'i~.bl of Public Trust. (United
State.:s) ,• tiA<t,!~~~~f~:z!,t Mey# 1970, 32.,.

pUblic

s~.rvant~

maintain in th$ir

r~a!;rect.ive

putlio <;ztmz:-10:1

with whici'1. we are <;oncorz'iiatL, 6

$ui,·~portiiibl.e,.

and lf.

offe.m:i~r aceo.rdi~9

$0 1

tJt,t.ermines

th~

;>tmliB!Ui?.ant for t.'lt't

t.o .l!;tatutori.1 pr<.lVi$ioiuh

The .i.s!l.'l'ue of cm1flic.t of interest, however, uau.ally

5

reference to these situations, or if some reference is fou..,d
there is such vagueness of langua.ge employed as to render a

.,
statute virtually useless in aiding a court's judgment process .. '
This resultant situation of "indefiniteness" due to
statutory, oirdssion or generality is not the sole factor
plicating tbe area of conflict of interest,.

other factors which comprise the

compl~i:m

com~..

The.re are many

environrr.ent in ·which

remedies to conflicts of interest are sought.,

One of the

most important of these is the way in which the game of politics is played.

'I1he functioning of the Atl'lerican political

party system includes as basic components the phenomi:ma of

patroni3.ge 1 campaign contributions, colt'.prise and the political price of comproraise, as well as the building of bases of

support among various organized groups in society.

All of

these have become integral parts of our party system, essen.
t y organ i za·t'1ons .. B
t i a 1 to the operat.•i on o f· success f u 1 par

Many of the situations forming phases of the conflict of
interest }?roblem arise from these facets of party activity.
While their r.>le in AL--rierican politics is not often questioned,.

the growth of "conflict situations" from them presents the
difficulty of drawin9 the line between practices that are
acceptable and those that are not..
......

'rho line itself must be

,,\ t

7Paul H., Jl.ppleby, t!qrali ty and Administration in
Macmiliian ·Company, I963), 23.

Democratic Goven1ment (New York:

aGeorge A... Graham, ~'lprf!.li ty .in l\lnerican. Poli tics
(New York;

Randorn. House, 1958); 86.

J;'Xlint out, solut.io:n\S

~u~t

be abroii.St of

1iJ~'lrarict1U1

soc:ial 1.iJ'td

ethical eta.."ld~u:'d.41 if th~y ara to ~~ aucc-a~.rntul. 9
parntive inaction of
iu:abl..a~ i~l

thill

i~i

bodios

dam.ling tJith th•s

partially at:tributnblil!l t...'> thei1n d!fficultias.

r~apact

confusit11iif•

l<:-agi~la:ti'l.~

The corrv•"

facet'~

th!il

!'or

~x~le,

~rn

of <.:otd.:'lict of 1n-t.ermst.. are quite
it 1.s

ar~pa.rttmt

t,hat

the natua."e of

tJ1ia problem is e~sent.ittliy t'U.ff~:rtnlt for i;;)::-t<rAcut.1.va v.nd
~toat

lei;islativa of'ficiala.
ear;ir'lel." public
l~ial

strictur0a

thim groUJ:.)
liit\i:t.•Rtion~
~nt.

neod

~Harva.11.'t~

of the ftu:El;>.ar ar9 f ull ... tis~

who a:re iilreudy

?:>~cause

ot

t.h-~ir

pubU.o

c~.tt ~1erlU\P$ btl dQ·~orih1ilid

upon thttd.r

h~havior

to

nua~rou$

(¥~1loyu~nt.

as being

a~1ara

whic~1

sut

of certain

when t:i.'l1t.k'.lrtakin<J nuch

It. is: tb.¢1 pt'i;'Jl,J.ta1ta: of alection
f1';;>>; cam};)'~d.gn

subj~l!ct

en:1p·li:l';/""

stltL.ulat.ia11 tba

contributicu1tit, patrona.ga, .a-nd tlrot':lise$

1

~xecut:.ive

agencies"' there is tha :pro tilem of high nppointi ve

officials. 10

One of t.,,11.e proble1r;s is the need to at.tract.,. an<!

retain, proven executive talent foit c<::rn'.!Paratively brief
periods of time from the bu~inoss world., 11

Those who stlrve

9"0Ve:rnment. in th!s <ti>tay do so with the intent cf

r~t.ur,ning

eventually to th<.tir ncm-governwental po..~iti.ons. 12
i:mI~act

of conflict

e~<l:cut.!v~

le~islat.ic:n

agencies must be

Tht1s,, the

n11on this particular group in

~€d.qbf!td

carefully.

!mot.her factor re5pon$l:ble for a cu1utioua. approacb. to

the

1~:roh~m

1$

t.i1Q

impact of oonfliot le9islation upon the

tttocial group ,of govexn~.nt employees a11d offioialth 13

If

b0h.avior limit.at.ions are le9'islated and prescribed,. tho

11.aert~l M. Sparks, "Conflict of ,.,,hose inte<rest?"'
on cri ticisrl! of thG ~ppoi.nt.rtlent of sue~l}saful
to n_; ublie off :tee, !Jr!f. t.ed Stat~s .. l Freemi:m,

{Co~ntint;i
husinf\l.ss~n

"'

Wfllil'li'

:st

8

question of their conformity to the qeneral behavior pattern
of the group develops.

If proposed limitations when strictly

enforced are harsh and impracticable, then we may encounter
the phenomenon of having them ignored in practice.

Problems of constitutionality are also encountered in
attempts to legislate remedies.

Constitutional questions

develop from the devotion of American government on all levels
to the principle of •separation of powers."

It is generally

recognized that the facets of conflicts of interest vary
among the three branches of government and that the legal
remedies available to meet them differ in the case of each
branch.

It is also widely conceded that the problem must

be approached and defined in separate and distinct frames

of reference.

Thus we employ within the framework of this

paper reference to the following categories of persons who

are publicly employeda
l.

Elected National Legislative

(ENL)

2.

Elected Hational Executive

(ENE)

3.

Appointed National Legislative (ANL)

4.

Appointed National Executive

(ANE)

s.

Appointed National Judicial

(ANJ)

6.

Elected State Legislative

(ESL)

1.

Elected State Executive

(ESE)

a.

Elected State Judicial

(ESJ)

9.

Appointed State Legislative

(ASL)

10.

Appointed State Bxeeutive

(ASE)

11.

Appointed State Judicial

(ASJ)

Throughout. this paper wo will deal. with the above distinct.
categories t'U\a the oontext of the presentation should clari•
fy the use of the appropriate category.

Bnforeenent schemos must of neoassity be distinct.
fo~ ea.cb branoh. 14 lt ls intet'esting, as well, to observe
that peat: World trar Xl studies and legislation on the sub•

3ect bavo confined their focua almost solely to the execut.i ve an4 legislative branches of government an4 have not.

sought. to pursue the problem among the judiciary. 15 This
omission however should. be rectified with the influx of
studies on th• United Stat.ifUJ Supreme Court appointment

There is also abuntlant legislation dealing with
actions which may influence. the deo1siono of

juri~•

and jud-

~es, 16 aoat of which is strictly constnod and swiftly en•
foroea. 17 Xn dealing with e•cutive offic::iala anct legislators, it is conceded. that barring the regulation of.behavior

l4aantord Watnwi, Conflict of Interest.I Politics and

the Moruax Gmz:e (New York a cowies" liook l!o~, 1§7

J, 115.

r

p,

l 5oaniel Sell, •crime aa an American Way of! Life,•
.l\.ntiooh. Review, (Summer 1953) XIII, 133. See also, A.A.
Iioiaow and'.'a.,I>; Lasswell, Powarhcorruition and.ttoct.itide
(ln9l•wood Cliffs, H.J. I -Pren. ce:..lfa I," Ui6JJ, '7! ....
16James MontgomeJty, "A Question of Bth1ciu »"41'1era1

Judge Presides over a c:a•e related to his own fortune.,•

(Judge Prank Gray Jr. in the Whale.Inc. bankruptcy proeeed-

Lnga before tt&a

u.s.

District Court, Nashville, Tenn.) Wall.

Street Journal, 176rl, OCt.ober 20, 1970.

17Gairol Gigl.ict.t, ::,award, ~e P~i!X:, Marlo A~nis~rat1on

10
by criJainal statutes one branch of government cannot bring

sanctions ageainst persona involved in conflict situations in
another branch. 18 In practice, this means that 1.u1cept for
criminal prosecutions the sanctions applicable to executive
personnel are goinq to be quite different from those applicable

to

legislative personnel.

An integral part of the entiro problem of qovernmental

behavior is the environment of double standards of morality
in which government officials and employees serve.

The

public outrage toward certain activities of qovernment employees is obviously not directed at identical behavior on
th$ pa.rt of offioials and employees of various business cor-

porations in the country.

Gift•9ivin~,

the use· of influence,

and lavish entertaining are all part of contemporary business
techniques.

It:

ts obvious that. what is tolerat.$d in private

business is not. tolerated in government by tho public.

'mere

are those who deduce that th• exist.once of such a double
standard precludes any real solution to the conflicts problem. 19

They suggest. that the prevalent standards of business will.
undet'fdne those tbat are sought for government.

This double

standard may plaae public employees at disadvantageous positions in society 1 but. thcu:e is apparently no alternative if

respect for governmental impartiality is to be retained.
·of

Justice in the

u.s. 1

Evils, Causes

a11'l coroi>any I .... Neil. York, I§g:n I 122.

a~d

'

Remedies (Dodd, Meade

lBDouglas, Ethics in Government, 51.
l9aalpb Eisenber9, •conflict of Interest Situations and
Remedies,• liutg~rs Law__Review, ll; (1959), 667.

ll

c.

'rhesis

it ia in the context. of such.diverse and cOS!lpeting

factors that consideration of "what. bas been done about con•
flict of interest• is undertaken.

The complexit.y of t.be

proble.m praoludos t.b.a enactment of sweeping legislation aa an
~••dy

affeeti.ve

because of u.ru:lt.lrtainty about. the 11\lpaot on

•o• of the related faotors discussed above.

'l"hus, a sort. of

aittlat.lonal approach to the entire problem has evolved.

Much

progress bas been made in attempts to define a potential# if
not nal, conflict of persol'lal and public i.nterests.

Not all

aucb defi.ni.tiona are sa.tisfactoey, but it has baen discovered.
that it is only in the consideration of concrete rd.t.wation•
tlu1t the problem acqu.f.ras real! ty. 20

One

rea~nt

focus in the State of V1rqin1a on this prob-

lem area concerned the question of wh•tber or not state
~udgea

could hold directorship l'Osi tions in local banking in-

atitutlonts. J1
IU&de

'A n-.ost valuable study of a similar problem was

in 1151 by a euhcoNtnittee of the United States S.nate,

Comit.tee on Labor and J?ublJ.o Welfeu:e. 22

'rb.e Study by this

20 tbid., 668.
2l!J.c!_l~o?,!;i ~imes·n,~seatch., Jan. 19, 1972.
225\lh(.:o~ttee of Senate committee en Labor and Public
W•lfare, &2nd Cong., 1st Se&ut., !8£:?rt., on ~~.~.~!~ St~~~rds

in aowrnment (1951) •

.....,.P'Ji

·r

ato

lll',._

12

aubccmmit.tee, chaired by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois,
is noteworthy because of its tborou9hnoss and tor the recommendations which it submitted.

Although none of tho recom-

ttiendationa was enacted, they remain important to legislators
u

the basis for continuing national and state proposals that

are offered to meet the problem.

Since the conclusion of the

work of the Ocuglas sUbcommittee,

nutt\y

more investigation•

have been undt.u:taken by congressional committees in attempts
either to oopa witb ·the. general problem <>f conflict of in•

terest au it. affects the federal go'V'ernment. or to explore the
details of singcle incidents aa they have com t:.o lig'ht. 23

The Douglils study resulted in the introduction of le9isla.tive
proposals-none of which was enaoted••tlnbodying- its recom-

mendat.1ons and of other proposals which offered a variety of
response•

to

the situations which were eXposed.

Investiga-

tions conducted oinee that tif'JO have alse> brought forth nu•

merous fed•ral bills tackling the conflict problem. 24

Deap:lta the concentration of public at.tent.ion on the
problem as it. affects the fet'leral government, 25 conflicts of
int.eroat have also been of concern in recent. years to some

?3
;!:,'Appleby,
!;!oralitx ..M~. ~in1st.ra1=-io~
Qovornnient, 24.
24 ~~~tres•f,e>nal

1~. D!,~crat12.

QU!,ltte.F.~l ~~na! (Waehin9ton1

1971), 68.

25wat.aman, £0?,~11C.:~.o.f Int:sres!_, 7t.

n.c.,

·

13

state government• that have undertaken studies in this area.
&aw York,

·~exaa.

Mew Mexico, New Jersey an4 Minnesota con-.

4uctad inquiries ini:o tho problera an4 its ramif.t.catioua and.
at~tee:i·to

develop aolut.ione appropriate to their own situ•

ations. 26 · X~ is only 1n New York and Texas, howewr, that
aucb stzw.U.u aul.m1nate4 in loqislait:lon. 27 In <:eorqla, on
the other h.an4 1 bt:oad 109.ielation dealing wlt:h oonfllots of

and 1nolud1ng: forceful penalties for violation• wo.•
eaact.1194 v1fth0ut:. the Wn&tit of• pr:Lor •#u4y. 28 ·
int.res~

D.

.

BVide,n•.~oduot.ed
~a't

Approach
.

fX'om etucliees .and proposals indicates

two fQftera1 avenuea of approach are available in bJ:ing-

1n9 fol'th conf11ot;

.poli~.

'?ha tlrst, and oldes1:. 1 ia the

4et1rd.t1on
ot a COfl.fl1ct situation in a crlbd.nal at.at.ut.e
. ..
,·,·"

.

witb pr<:>vleioa tor approp:tiate uanct!cma of tmprJ.aomuent or
fine, oJt ltoth•. llbere la no desire to embrace wit:h1n a con•

«iainality activ!t:.ies wtiicll may appear evil on the

cep~,ot

aui:t&ao but. involve no nal ra1soon4uct:.
l'

The result. 1a that.

:;

ed.at1n\J ci"imirull statutcu• dealing- wit.h conflict. td. tuations

etthoi- a:r:e •PP1lcable to clearly ntpugnaat behavior or ue

26a1a•n1'4trq1 •eonfl.lQt of J:nt:.ereat.,• 610.
27J •
(IJOSilOIU

a. Klonoald.,

ed • .1 The Politi.ca, of L~!,1 ..1U!,~ico

t.J.tt.1• lrcnm od co. , 1176) , 24I.

'-

2 81bi4•. , 241 •.
..

.
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as to exclude a host ot activities that
fom the real eor$ ot the problem. 29 Thus, moat statutes

p•rased so

genera~ly

have been found inadequata as qu1des to evaluating current
situations and have led to another approach to conflict cir•

~e

promulgation of codes of ethics u

gu1dee to

'JOV$'rnNntal behavior has occurred at both tllf:a federal and
the fifty state level to meet this lnadequaoy. 30 A code of

ethics 1• perhaps best. defined as a statonient of behavior
for government officials t1nd employees. 31 ~he code may be
embs:aced in a statute or •rel1' in departmental re9ulations
or in a leg!alattva reaolution..

It 1erves the purpose of

clearly ata.ting to public of ficiala and to the publ.to what

is acceptable behavior.

A cooe may oar:ry with it sanctions,

•1tb.ough the sanctions are seldom criminal.

Dismissal from

office is a common t!Sanction (uinly for ANL, ANE, ASL and
ASB job categories) associated w!th codtut of ethic&.

Im•

plicit in the plt'omulgation of a aode of o·t.hicm, however, is

the notion tha.t each situation in the future will be evalu....
at.ed on iL't pa:ttioular nterit41.

4rhis process, to be workable,

requires some sol!e of enforoanaent system tbat. permit1l inves•

ti9ation in'° the details of each situation that arises.
•• .

J

I

M•

l

'oQ"f

1

~ ·--

2!t!.f!R2;'t on .~~~pal, ~~~~~1.~t o~.. Inter~!!.,....~.2:t.al~ti!Jn,
pta. I•Il.

30.nouglas, !,th1~¥. in .Govern~~!.· 7• (Tbeau.a codes include
9u1&111nee for cUt'4cutlve, !egls1atlve~ judicial and admini•
st~a.t.ivo

personnel.)

3laeor~ A. Graham, Mpz;~J..~tz_~n.,Atllerican Politics
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~e

nature of conflict. of interest dif!ficultic.s can

only be appreciated in the s1tuat1ona themselves whiol\ are
of ConQ'brn to the public todar.

Most. of the situations ara.

c()l'QlOn to all lewls of government although their 1mpl1o&t.ions
may~ quite different. on each levei. 32 1::)¢iattn9 le9ialat1on
and lo91fllativa propoaala 4ew:mstrate a great cleal of aitni•
larity in the areas of coneem.

But they al•o

rev~al

cl1f•

forenoos in the puticular situations that receive great
st.reaa and in construing activities as oril'd.nal tb.a·t are felt

"° be 1mp):oper.

f:rom particular

a. particular

Otten the ditfetenooa in ~:unpha•ia derive
air~tancea

l~vel

of vovomment. or

cern .aa a result of scandal.

p~oved

a problem of

atim~lnted

9eneral con"""

that have

J:n any case, t.rea:tment. of con-

flicta of interest. by the federal qowrnmnt and CQrtain
GtateAJ. in statutes tu.l.d proposals J:eveals

~0v~ra1

(New YorJa Rand.om Houso, l1.Hi2), 32.

32Eisenberw, •conflict of Interest,• 669.

broad aroas

CW\P'rlU~

II

sunVEY OP UOISLATIOl'l

A.

Span and Scopo

The principal, and perbaps basic, situation of conflict
of f.:nt.ei:eat .ts the acceptance of eoiapensat.ion trom private

source• for direct government-related services.

Thia prac-

tice, bribGry, i• reflected in tho notion tho.t •a un cannot
tud:W two masters at. the

fllatae.

time.•

~bus

a public official

.le not to ace.pt. additional e:ompensat.ion for the performance
ot hia pUb11c duties froxa

·An

interested party, or generally

to • ae11 • hie infl.uenc:e to pEtrsons who hope t.o profit in so•

Ma.aura through it..

Nor is he eXpected t.o profit hiNelf

from his official acts

or from his official position.

Much

qonf11ct. of interest legtelatto:n or proposed le9ial.ation cen...
ters about this problem with the situations that. must be
dealt with 9onerally varyin'J in the directness of the
tion's

e"istoru::o.

au~"

sit~a

as will be denoJ'ustratod below, it. is

quite difflcn1.lt! to le9.tslate in such a way as to •et all of

the varyinf fo!:tU and implications whiol1 develop in tbe area.

We oan refer to the activities encOt'lpassed u the
p:robleta of the usta of influence and 1>ositJ.on in

qene~al.

itost of the situations in this area of influence arid f>OB!tion

17
are difficult to define explicitly.

4rho key asswption be•

bind thotll is that pllblic officials by the power or p.r~stige

of their off too or tJ:1e friendships t:ha.t they cul t.i vato are

able to exert
&iac.tsiOD.$.

oons.td~rable

direct influence. on yovernment.al

Thia tnfluenae canbe ma.ni:fostad in many wayu

.ra.nq.1n9 from acceptance of another salary to the use of

per~

•onal eontaotu to aftoct: a favorable decision by another pub•
lie official in

re~\U'n

for

c~ruut.t1on

cl!' compensation in

kind •. :tt also includes the !nfluenoe•effect th•t ensta when

public officials aot. dit:octly as repreuent:.at!vea of a party
in a case or hearing bofor0 qovernmantal agencieu., 1
Two p11e:ral appJtoacbl!e to the cf4bove type of conflict.

uitua.tdon are

appar~nt.

One daala in

gen.e~al

tams with the

use ot tn.t'luence and the other 1eeka to treat the !nf1uence
that

po~nt1ally

exlsts when direct representation occurs.

The two cl.asses of $1tuat.ions are considered to90ther because
t.he lat.tar kinda of situations

rect and in.direct

e~mnples

tlr~

perhaps both the tWOat di•

of the use ct

influenc~r

that, is,

d1J:>eot !n thtii san•e of olear partJ.oipat.ion in a ceuHt and i.n-

~u
... .n
i
""""'rec1'1t

""'"'""'
~.u.....

n:r:ec1••
•anner
;:.~

bv
.#;

which influence is e:icert.e.d. a

1.

Federal teg!slation

A prohibition
b~en

ha& lon9

ot

fairly direct aituatlonll! of

a p6rt of! a f'&il•ral lnw.

t.~1s

kin4

Section 281 of !'itle

ltii of the OnJ.t.ed States Coda originated in 1164 1 .and a1nce
tbtdt

t.1~

tion•l

it has bMn &tm')nd+)·d to od.tber. include

off1~ra

o~rt.ain

addi•

or to e1'olnpt. retired li'111itaq, otfieera from

CtJrt.a1n provisJ.ons.

ni!s !lltatut.e prohibits COn\1t'tltSSmon, d$•

partment. hoads, or other Un1te<lStat(tG officers and employees
frolt1 •a1rectly or 1n4irec-tly• r:eo4iiiv1ny

ceive •My

ocmpf;l.na~:tion.

~ender•d., ~1ther

for any

OJ:."

aqrt1t-einu to

s~rvicos rend~rod

r•-

or to be

by h1Melf or another• in relation.

w any

proceet11n~h • • ., befor-e any. departrJent., ,or .agency. • •
'itli~

11 •

3

tiuanot.ioru.1 pRvS.ded for vJ.clatiotui am a fine of not J1Wrt.t

t.biui fl0,000 or J.nprimonm.er•t for up to two yeitu:n, o.r both,

aa •ell as incapacity t.o hal<i federal offices in the

futU1t$o

Court cases ariaLnfi undiar s$otion 2S1 ha.vu givon broad scope

to these

proh1bi~tona.

The pUl!'poee has

b~en

v.f.eved as bann•

inci •b;ribery J.n .its open or subtle fona• 4 znld ouch practic~e

•• ue J.noonsitJtent with an off!aial.*a loyalty to th$ •b¢tet.
inte-re•t of the 9ovemr&1ant to t1hicb the et1A1~1cwee owea his
f.lr$t and nigh.eat onliqat!on. • 5 tn addition, the wronq done

4Mu•...~~~X •. "'•.

2~!-l.!!1-~!~~~!.' 3211u.s. ' ' , i9 (1945.

'ui11ted State•••>••""•
Ve loo~~, l48Fed.ll2 (e.,c.Olre.1t06) •
•.••

5'JW'""'ullifd;•Ml4••~•-

o•tJ

Llflldl .....

the publl.o by high executive or le411t$lativo officillltt who
try to unduly empl&J their tz•ower and

W'OUU
C\U'$

prettJti~c

to

$~""

favor.ablec ;overn•nt.al at'tt:.ion has been noted. 6
Tlta atat.uu i.t:t

a.pplie~l"

only to $eirvices of *Z)"f1cu-

tive (Mf2l) or tndepe.Munt a9e.ne:!cs tiJnd not to those <>f tbe
court (A'NJ) o:t Con~tJsa (fJU.), a feature wld.oh eo~ persons
ViGW

as a ehortaom!ng. 7 Hu.ch rJritioisn baa boen <ltroetea

at inadt.r:tquac1ea .tn section 281,
a~cfaptlons

tump~oi~lly

in tho numerous

to 1ts provi11ions Gnt,'1 in a lack ot

cl~r.tt.y

as to

just what s'lttrvioeta are inalut..~ed. 8
Federal inter&st. bi fU'itl'>lif!cat!on ot thJ& statutes

tlea:U.n9' with .tnfluette$ wield1nq baa not

r-e~ul ted

in si9nJ....

ficant; additional l.e<Ji,,lation despit$ alJtOf!Jt tnnm".fU."abl.*''
~J:opol'.lal.u.

'f1'lc Douglas staff report. ettJracad a. good tn.m.ber

of th.es• an4 urged that section 2Sl be a•ru.ted to prohibit
p4~nt

of

~fuuatioo

for

intluenc~

reoeJ.J~t o! •neh ool!1Pensation. 9

1'b3

1.n addltion to the

report further rimcont•

mnd• tbat section 281 be Ude applicable to Congr(!as and thie

1940)

pt. 1.

&~ReF.\..~ P!l~e.f.!!..~~pt~!~!:.... o~. _;t~!!~..!!~. ~Jtf.'l~~C?~,
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ln addition,. cl.arifiaaeion was proposed so that.

oour:te.

nWU<i!U.t'OUAJ e.b:CUf4.Btance11 wh~re oon~·penaation is due p~rsons
~o~v.toes

tor

performed prior to 9ovemit.0nt employment ud wb0re

hdattal cmployeeG &id other f$doral ea1!1plora.ca in

bofOh pvcu:noontal

t.\4J9fU.':ie.9 (J.• e., f

proe.c1Bding~

Ci Vil S!!ltl:Vi.Ce) CAUl

be

remov"4 from eov@.ra.g~. 10 Anotb'(llt" proposal was for a olari:f!.t•
o~ddon

m~ction

of the prtutent e:xaupt!on8 to

r:etit-od office.rs of tho a~d torc4'1u1. 11
p.topoeals

aff~u:e(1 indttipei1til~ntly

gQtouiuN~ll:t

11ou:ght to

wre

propo~ttd mDX'()

aoeo~~ll.ish

201 a11 it af:f.ectlli

Other legi•lative

o.f the 1953 11tudy have

the

s~

ends.

Sither they

11a.rrowl.y 1.n i.ndi.victu.al. bllltt or would be

at<:®~~lished ~a p~rt

of far broader bills that endeavor to

enlarge the covcrtt9"e of t..'lG pr41sont statutes by def'.lninq.

other aonfliot situatton$ .. 11 ~e 1at':k ot le13isl.at.1ve act.ion
is

t.•sti~ny

to the d.iffie.ulty of d.:1fining euoh situations

#atia.factorily.
Mother federal 9tat.utl.i't in this area that causflJS

fewot: dtffieultioe and oritiois11 prohibit•
off1eit\l or

~n~ployeo

from

reo~i ving

A gov~nmont

any aalaqr in

oonn~atlmt

111.tb ht.a public dutltJa from any soue-e other than the f(llderal

gcfta:in•nt ot
·~pen

$'!lob

st.a~

p•~nts

or local 9overnmont.s.

~•e

prDllib!ticn

is equally applieablA to tho governr.t-emt.

21

Gt:1ployees reoei,ring such salary and to per.sons or corporations
:inakin~

the contributions.

Violations bring penalties of finaa

of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not rnore than six
months, or both. 13 This section is so clearly phrased that
few problems develop in relation to it. 14

It is to state

level quastions of potential oonfliot of interest that atten....
·tiott is now direotad.

2.

State Legislation

Act.ion by at.ate governments in this araa of prohibiting
influence-wielding for cornpenaation or prohibiting the prose-

cution of claims aqainst: 'the st11te is comparatively rare. 15
Xn the latter category, this is largely attribut.&ble to that

feature of st.ate '4J'OVornment wherein many positions are obviously not., nor intended to be, full-time positions. 16
Fu:rt.b.e.rmore, the salariEHS paid such officials also indicate

that something less than full•tima service is axpeetea. 17 Add
to this tho generally beavy preponderance of lawyers holding

------------·---

l3!,e2or~•.?n ~~~ca~_!!t.andarda in Government, 51.

l 4:misenbcu:g, •conflict of Interest," 672.

-

151bid., 673.
l6Klonos1d., ed., ~ha 1)0!1!!_cs of .. Local_ J~~~!ce, 59.
see also, Wat.am.an, £<'.tnfl~pt_o! ~terest! .F'?~:ft'ic~. ~na_tE.!,
!.~nex. G~me, llB.

l 7Burea.u of Census 1 ~aal and. StaJ::o.. Gove~_!l~e~t .rin~!l~s. ·
in.. selected Areas and LarJe ~ou~~es,_. !Tui-19,o twaufiln. gtona
iureau · 'ol ciiiiii's, I9'I) , • The satary Breakdown for posi-

tions witb which this paper is concerned indicates tho salary

is not sufficient a1J a $Ole yearly income.

22
bigll state political cff1oG, and the

in9

import.an~

diffi'"'~lty

phases of a privat9 lm1 praotice

pu.blio officials 04m be appreoiat.ea. 18
nas it.s

t~i)a.ct.

upon how one

~1.9nt

of prohibit.•
~aintainau by

Thia 51tuat1on, too,

interpr(\tt a pxohtbition

upon influence-w1$ldiny Wh1)n, for exarSlple, a state lGg:islator

in retained aa at.torn.,y in a. hoarinq before a public agency •

.u. General Legialat.ivo Approaches
l.

tnfluenco•ped.dling

Geor9ia, the only st6lte whiuh. bM adopted very •tr.in.•
'1l'lllt :prohibiticnr1

not cov.at:

th~

on th.e question of se@king influence, did

variou3 other kinds of conflict questions.

ln.-

st.ead, C®orgia dealt with many variations of influ.onc:e-s-el\lk•
ing and w.?"eldi.ng in a relati voly apeoific stnt.uto wit!1 heavy

o.riminr. . l aaxiet1ons av4ilabl11i.

Releva11t port.iona o-f tho

$tl'ict, ll!ingtby •t.atu.ta {:toimonatrate the Georgi.a approneh.

FC:l"

exm:nple, th@ lalil provideui tbats

Wh(X)'ler, i)ein9 an of fioer,. • • '1.al~s, or accepts,
or: reaa1ws, any r:t0ney, or any obecm, order, contract, • • • for the l~H))1'ns&fr'tnt of money, or for the del•
ivory or oonveya,ncl'it of ruiything of value, vi.th the
in.tent cf proourin9 er att..a~~ting to procure the
paeiuige or d~feat. the pas.oag-e of any l<tgiala.tion
by th"l Gen4i!ral Asaernhly, ... • shall b~1 guilty of a
felony, • • •

tfnoever, being an of fioer 1 c~loyee, • • • accept.a
or a.nyth!r19 of v.:1lu~, . . . . eh.all be guilty of
a :telon-/, • • •

r~on;ey,

19Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage. and Political
z;1Artie,')~l, u ~puf~ji.v¢! .. !.~U.\~if1~. ~.11 ...~~ci!~l'... !l!.t.~1. ?,;st9,~X, (July,
1968), 4&&.
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Whoever prord:see, of f0rE*, or qivea any mcrie.y or
anyt.hinq of value, • • • shall be quilty of a
felony, • • •

Whoever« being am officer or employee. of, ., ••
or parson acting f()r tbs atato, .. • • •~ka, acoepta,
or x:eoeivcs any money, •• • shall ~ guilty of a
fctlonj~, AAd upon convietion shall he puniGbed by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not lcs1,; than
one yoa.r nor w:>re than 20 yoars.19':t'h@ sections of the tleor9ia stat.utii quoted above etrike
at. inf luencG•peddl.in~ by (.Utplioi tly ptiol'd.bi tinq tt4!Vltu:al man!....
Thun eeeld..n.~ to influence the l$9isla.ture

faetations of it.
far

CO!A.i.?fll'il'Ul~tion

as to

e~rac~

is bai1n0d and tho 1iu:-ohihition ia so

eollcieat!on,

pos1t!oi\, which in turn i!l

aooi:lptanc~,
e~pan<fod

ph~ased.

and receipt of com-

to inolude- almoat

llU:)

WlnY

posfl1ble f<>rros of di:t:~)ct and indiract compemuation as are

oonoa!vable.

Most. .1r.s1,ortant, thn sto.tute seeks to strike at

both ends of tl:.e ".influencfl process" by bannlngi both tht.•
pe:r:aon ot'fer!n9

i.nd.uce~nt$

of var:touu

utic woUlt1 accept such indUCi!ll?aents. 30

applicable to all

off!i;:!al~

i~lnda

and the Qffic1al

Tb1$J1Jt1 $1!lotions are

of the utate vith

tb~

exception

of members c.>t the a~org1a G~nert!ll Asaerrbly an<! officeu;s

th'-l judiciary..

aut both of

q~oted @o\ra arG covered bll'

t.ht~se

ot

exceptions to th0 S«i'iOtion

iv.1ditional f:Jf.tationtt 'tibich prohibit

both the affflU:ing and aoceptlU'lce of inducenw:tltiil by theaa

----•HJJainee c. scot.t, •corruption, ttachine Polit.:cs and
Soot.al Change,• AtMtr~.~~~!.0~1.~.~S!'Ll~l!.£! ..n~'?'iet!, ,,3,
(lt49), 192.
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offioials.

This is clearly provided for in individual sec-

tions, each of which deals either with the offering of such
inducements or the acceptance of them by, first, the members
of the General Assem.~ly and then judicial officers. 21
The harshness of the Geor9ia Statute on inf luence-ped•
dling is fairly clear.
too much so.

The sanctions are formidable, perhaps

The coverage embraces all branches of government

and both sides of the influence process, and the intention
is apparently to include all forms of compensation by apeaifying checks, orders, guarantees, security, etc.

It may be

ar9ued that Georgia's action is commendable, but there is
much difficulty in the enforcement of the statutes and in
merely determining the existence of the various forms of com•
pensation.

For example, the problem of determining if ain-

tent to influence• remains. 22

Naturally, too, there must be

willi.ngness on the pa.rt of responsible officials to investigate
and prosecute violations if the statute is to be meaningful.
The primary characteristic of Georgia's conflict of
interest legislation adopted in 1959 is the wide scope of the
act.

It embraces, in addition to the provisions quoted above,

activities which are not usually considered to be part of the
aonf lict area•-the gray zone--but rather belong in the black

22Eisenberq, dconflict of Interest," 675.

~oma

of clearly and c>bviously i.mpropcr activ1t.ie$S.

troau itn.;bg:zlemnt., thaft, extortion,

misau!l~

~or9.ta

of public

fund$, ld.ckbacka, purjury, 1$nd wome aspect$ of bribery in.

the •~ broad statute in vh.tch less clear nituationm are
at.al
AppeH'&.ncea Bitafo~e State Jl.90ncit19

2.

flew York' a approa<;h to t.h~ 4i.J~neral problem o:f influenc•

Md pt<ll!taai.nq
G~or,g!a's.

a<1parate
a%ea~h

elai~

Uew York's. statut&o, enacted in 1954, atnploy a

for atHilinq with eael1 of

t.ec~ud.qu4l

conce~-;>t

l'itst, t.hil

st.ate ta

&9ainat tho state d1fftu;$ ma:dt~dly frcna

bro11d~Mri

to

t.:!H:t!h1~ p:robl,~m

a~airurt

of prass.tn9 claim$

includ~

the

•appearances befor'd state a9en-

cd.t.u11. • 24

Tli1a cx1lar9es th.n Bc<>pt.? of th$ prohibition so that

:u.e~nsinq

board$,

of uonfltoe
tlua

t~9ulatoey ~fJttmaietiJ, franchiae-~td;erh1i.ng

allt'HJ~tio11s

f•4l~ral governmiu~.

tatnly

ap~Ji'Opriat.u.,

offic~Jt•

o.nd

2ti

e~•loy~etJ

in case-a btit,ftn:.'fi.\ such

and eitat.aa, a ttider

oov~t'Q9'~:'

tjzhus tlGW Yot"k f..>l"Ohibi ts

4s

w~ll

or

i~'liea•

of both

is cer-

~x~<;uti ,..re

as l(:!9lll4lators and l@qirslat.tw

employees from reolf,living or enterirt'l into an
i~::&s$

agena!~s

a~:p:@<e~t)nt

•e:K•

for cont.tngent foes for s*'u:vtce!IJ to be

23Ga. La~.,• l9S1l. e.24, Sec:. ;a1.

24N. y. !?t.tbl.£a Offiae:t"a Lav. Sec:., 73, Par., 4.
2. 5GeQ.t9'ii. A. Grahaft, 1;Jif!-.!.~i .i~ .Alr'6~~.~!w.-P9.f.!~~~?.,
(New York 1 iumdom. Bouao, ." . , 9 •

-

26 tbld. , ' ' ·

:u;
t"$n<l$red rttlaUve to •any Cl.l:ao, proceedin9, ct):i1lication0, or

ct.ber matt~r b$fore any st~t~ agency.• 27
i~Qrtant. to

involved

It is ~apecially

not.o that it ia only wbt.'ln contin9E-mt foes are

th~.\t

a state official is barJ:ed froitrt etJ)ixuu:inq before

''11t'tuAlly all ~tat:e ageno.114$.

Otherwise it is not

propex- for s~oh offioe:r:s to roake ltppearanoes. 28
tioll. of the prob.lbit.1on to *'contJ.ngent

f~e"

dtl\)~~d

im.-

Tho limit.a•

ca£Jes ia a roalis-

tic approaob. tthich •cknowledgae the existElnce of d.uAl roles

fot many •tate officials, part1cul~rly leqialatora. 29
seeks to daal with a

troubleso~

n~aeau1u1rily non-qovfll~ntal

ar<@a wi tbout

~tu1.tng

It
un-

aeti vi ties of state of fioiala.

VJ.elation of t.I1is l'>t'OVision is a mi•dairieanor. 3°

At* for the

tluanoe,
l'ilil@'ll

UGW

9'~nera1

York bas

problem of

ahO$tm

sc.'el~ing

or <ixerting ln•

to legislate prohi.bitions without

i l l . , , • • . • •~.,- • •

27New y,or" Public Officarli Lav* Sec., 13, Pau:., 2.

-

28 Ibid.
29nayless ,Manning, "'l'hs Purity J?otln.toh..1 An ~suitay on
Cf>nflict. of Inttare1t, J\rt'.e~i.can Gowmment, and Moral ssoalaUon,• f:$der..!!~ii.r J~na.~, 24cl, (S~r, 1964), 79. In .
:t'cference iii a puEicutu Comonwoaltb of Vir9inia situation,

the :reru1Gli: ai\jfht..look at the efferts of Delegate WilliAn
:Rwlinga tn ~lie Virg-lnta Qeneral Assembly. tmle9ate.J'tAwling-11
riu been atte~ting to ban ~ppe11ranc:es of Virqini& Gen,u:al

Aa!Bembly iniembitu:s as c;ouru11~lm in eases before the Sta~ Corporation. co~.tHfion. ~ff~~~~. ~.!!:!~·Pi!!!~!:'-<?.!l1 March 11, 1973.
JON~V

York Public Offioei::s Llf.w, Sec., 75, Par., 6.

27

Ql:'iminal sections.

irney are e'!lbraoed 1n a Gtat.utory eode

of etmtoe conta1n1nf :aev.ll'al relevant vrov1u1one on the a.W•
jOcCt. ln itfl atatoMnt.a of Standards
•nt employe9s.
•othe~

Of

beh&ViOlt for ijJOVOX'rl.•

Activities prohibited include.

acaeptan~

of

e.mployeant which will !mpail: hi• in(lepende:nca of.

:Jud.pent. in the exercise of bia official dtUtJ.es,• 31 ud uatnq

oi: attmaptia9 to uae. one• s •offio!al posi t..l.o.n to aeoure

priv11•9cs or: e~•inpt:ioua tor hiaself oi: othete.• 32 These proapplicable to offloera and employoes ot state

•~•

visions

•pnoi••i

logi•l~~:r:a., ~

logislative euployeff.

Iu a&ti•

tJ.ou ,. tbe code atr.lkes a.t the J.n.flilGno• pft>bl.•m :by · 4eol:ar.S.nq

a public official ahoul4 not. conduct hisnself ao u to

tba~

•91ve

ba.f.a for the 1Japress1oa that any person can
~rcporly tnflut0noo him. • • .• 33 Furt:.he~re, a stat.a
~••sonGble

.offJ.oial. •should an®cvor to pursu• a courao of conduct Vbieb

w.f.11 not.

~•1••

a\laplcion among.

tl1•

publ..tu

~a-t

be

is likely

to be llng&tJOd in acts that are in vJ.olAUon of hi• trust..• 34

Yne aUt\tte deacr1b1ng t.11cu10 stan4artta pJ:ovitlea no aqction•
f(:)lf

tbeic v1olatJ.on.

one ata.tut.e ot the conflicts package of

1•'if• ill 1154 ..npow~u~·a4 the attorney 9"tteral to eat.tblish an

rutviaot:y co.tt.too

°" e•"!S.oa.1 •Htan4arda to oon.ttuot 1nveau1• ·

9aUou and IU\ke J:faCC-.n4fltions conctarn.1.n.f al.l•ga4 vtolationa. 35
•t

.l

h•••Rill'•"

>

fl•.i•f

......

llwew York P'Ubl1c Offtc:asrs t,aw, sec., ?4, Par., 3.

33tb1d •

32tbtd,,
,
.. '

I'

1

34tbid.
35uew York Bucutd.ve Lav. Seo., 74.

Imt;)lioi. t in the New York code is the
and.

reco~ndat.iona

of that

J..d(l&

COfl1..mitt.~e

and the Attorney ·

Oe1un:al he fo"ardecl to the @tate agency
n~/

aut.hori ty

ov~r

that the findini:;s

pos$e~.using

disetpli•

the indivt4ual or individuals concerned in

nported violatlona. 36 1th.us appropriate disciplinaxy act.ion
fro~ th~

emanates

employing agency.

inelud- auspen$il1on
general.

te~,

aon~d.d.uration

t't°'~Jt

s.itiiationu •• tb.;eiy oat.nir.

ot the

that nuch a gener.al
in

The

1nvasti~at.ion

stat.e~nt

practic~·-tbat

lnd.!aat~

problem

i'.ff to be aceom-

It may be argnBd" how--

ofi improper behavior ie

1.t is so 9.,nor:al

.i'lS

to forbid

Tl:tls wty be so,. but !ti. does sicn:vc to

not."ling specific.
cl.eat:ly

infloonc~

or improper in tha individual.

p11llht\ld by an OUt.$1de obj"ctive boey. 37
~an1ngla~ui

WQ-Uld

New York aaknowleetuaa the difficulty of

cl(l)arly <i'd!:lning what is

eve~.

tU.~c1p11ne

OZ" r•~..oval.

By couchintt ite
Li1

.such

to tht)

e~loytife

or off'!<:d.tt.1 and to

th~

that: suob a general at.an.dud of conduot ltli &xpeated. and
Vh$n

viol~t.:tons ooour~

ci.pl.inary

st~p•

ta):••

o:t

employee the

with. indiv1d.ually.

t..~at.

thetf w11l be inventJ.gat•c.1 and some dis-

It offer$ the public a!lsur1Ance of an

tnv<ulti.gation into allegatioom of

cial

public

a~auranoe

i~ropri~ty

and tb.o of fi•

that each caet! will b1!-l dealt

'Zbcu:e are no r~strietd.ona which confine

tlle ®termination of

irnp.rop~r

characteri,stics nor ia it

aotivites to specified

to em.brace peculiarity of
appearance within the notion of improprJ.ety,. 38
po~sible

Texas end:-eavored to treat thEi general problem of 1nf.luencu!l in its conflicts legislation but omitted any dirEtct

refereneG to th$ prosecution ·of clair.is against thie stau. or

appe4l.ranooa befora stat$ agencies.

The Texas

legisl~tion

promulgates a code of ethics without criminal aanct.!onlll. 39
Provisions relevant to influence af feet of'f ice rs,

er~"'>loyeea

of state ageneias, legislators, and legislative employees.
Such a person is prohibi·ted from accepting 11iftn, favors, or

services •that

~i~ht

reasonably tend to influence him in the

d1sobarge of his official duties,• 40 usin9 Hln official posi•
tion to secure special privileges or

ex~mptions

•except as

may be otherwise provided by law,• accepting ether employment
that "might impair his indll.'Jpendenoe of judqt!lent in the per•

formance of his public duties,• or aoceptin9 additional compensation for his 11Jervices for the state. 41

Taxna proviaea

t.hat. violations of any of the prescribed standards of conduct

36t:iaenber~h •conflict of Interest,• 679.

l 9 ~exas Lawe 1957, Par., 6.

4oibid., Par., 2.
41£isenber9, •conflict of Interest,• 6B2.

30

constitute grounds for e:qJuls!on, removal from office, or
discharge. 42

However, there is no enforcement mechanism

created for the Texas code.

The principal advantage to be

cited for the code is that it does describe a statement of
standards.

Determination of infractions, however, will still

require much thought and probably involve great controversy.
What is employment that can impair independenoe of judgment?
What does •reasonably tend to influence• mean?

'rhe specific

problem is that these determinations will be made ad hoo as
situations arise by any or all of a number of power centers.
Such is the case generally today and the Texas code of ethics
really will not afford much assurance to the pub>ic that a
determination will be made or to an employee that a really
innocent circumstance will be fully and impartially explored.
3.

New Jersey

New Jersey, in its comprehensive study of conflicts of
interest, sought to dea.l with both the problem of appearances
before state agencies and the use of influence generally.
Because of activities that stimulated the study, New Jersey
was particularly concerned with condemnation proceedings.

one of the principal recommendations of the New Jersey Legislative Commission on Conflicts of Interest was a statutory

31
proh!bi tion upon rece1v!ng, directly or indirectly• oompen-

aati(>n fo:: ae2':V1ce1t rencte.t'ed in connection

vi~' eithf.UZ'

con•

d~mna1d.on

neqotiations or in prooHdinqs before a eonde-mnaUozi co.iaidon. 43 ~ia ban wau -to a.pply to atatq offiC$>:a,

enploy•••, appo.l.nt:ees, and

~r•

of the l•~rf.slature.

tn

atiaition, 1t waa pa.-opoeed that thi• attme groupof person•
co\114 not, for compensation, •petrsonally appea.r- aa an eleport;
w1t.n•••

be~fore•

.egenoiea. 44

any of the eight:e•n erut•rated stat.«t

'lhtasJo ~encies i1u::l.U({,,4 'tl1e Dapal!l'tmont. of Public

tltilttles, Divta1on of AlC«ib<>l1c nevera.90 Cont#ol, D1vta1on
of

Vehiclea, O!.vislon of ':ax Appe•ls, State Pat"olo
aoai-4, and tbe Wag-o an4 Hour nuroau. 45 It was further rocomJ;totoJt

u.ndtad that thoae 9Q11t.y of violatin9 either ot these pro-

posal• would

.,be

punished by fines up t:o $3,'000 or.a mmttmum

of two para .ln p•laon. 46
~·•• ~o~ndati<uts

$-he obvious a!uaracte~1atlo of

ia t.hair

b~ad

sc;ope.

me.roly contingent fee appt.u11zucea. but all

Prohib1•1nq not
c~onsat:od

appeu•

ancea before tiJ• enumerated st.ah agenoiea antl in cont.tomnatton
prooeetiaqs tllef would have. had a treMndoutt impact. upon a
• 1awyfUt•heavy• 1e.tt1•lature an4 upon lawyor hold.tru1 loss than

fllll•ttmo position• tlu:ou911out. st.ate 9over.nNAh. 47

,

lfbey do,

4 3Re2!Rt nw Janey Lo91•1aUve COM!tution on COnfl1ot.

of 1ntaxoiit"tst'ate Printing Offiaea Newark.

:w.J.,

1957).

·

44.
Xbid •., a1.

4.Slbid., 21.
461bid., 34.47.nalph Urf.i.ih&tlti, •ttefleotions on Bureaucratic CotrupUon,• ~~~0J¥,~~1~~·?.!~~~1h 4014(1962), 11.

32

howovor 1 illustrat(fl t.oo vigorous an apJ)roach ·to the contl1ote
prOble•.

Al~hough

doors to tl1e

~t

aomtlU!trKlable aa an atto1$1pt to

all

critical eonfllot situations, such pro-

po•als nu.at be V14'lwed u
~copit..ion

s~ut

botli 1.-practioable M4 inapproprl.at:e. 41

of tho .faou ot st.ate governmant. ln:tnga to tlla

f.roat the con.tral th•lSle that many state officials do not hc14
fttll•ti.JllO positiona .nor 1n .oat. caaea ie there iK\ed tor tbea

to do ao. 49 . certainly, •tats ana local legislat;orat ue ex~cted

t.o be only part-ttu polloy-kWlkers, e.nd the uso of

1n.m.-1:0w.

put-ti~ ~aa1c~ere

and board -l'l'lbero by utntes

-4 1oca1iti•u• 1• we.11 Jtnwn. so ~o limt t tJ~ private acttvi•
tie I$ of thetto of fic.ials would cripple a 9ood part of stilt•
. . .·

..... 51

f;CWt'nM&•""•

Xa cOittr•t to the h•r•b lfJ>CCifAo pi:oid.tli tiona dis•

cu.seed flbove, t:be New Jersey groUp recom$?\ded a more tempetr&te

~ppJ"eaoh

to th• lnfluence-wl•ldtng pr:obleio.

.t·ts pr0posala Ln thS.s area
jg"

···-~····- . . . . .

w~o

Many of

based upon th• Mew Yol:'k

tjq""

48ih.i.d., tt.

49s.., Ch•t.ax

xx,

footnote 17.

solfh• read.Qr sthoul4 tak.e note qf the work load •it,,u•• ·
tioa. Xn Vir9inl• logialat.ots at. both tbe at.ate awl local
lewl a" &:>r the t30St; pa~e put•t;.lme Polley.make~•· tn
sev~u:al otllu states and. at the fttdel:al level ctonflict of in•

t~H.'fHtt legislat:i~n applle• to ~·

full•t.1• le9iala1:or. Xn
tnis paper we have choaen to Wile exm:splea of oontl.lott. legi••
lat-S.on without re-g•i:d to t:he put:-Ume 01: tull•tl• •t:at:u. of
the l.•gialatolr.· ·

Sloa the other hand th• hiring of more f \lll•t.iae protes•
raionala wol'.lld c.aus·o enon:ous salary expett:a.i tur••• Walt8lan 1
con,fl~cst.f>! I,!lt;eJ;"eat1 , folitlo~.ftl!~.~e.. ~~%.~, 182.•

33

Under ~~e threii'lt of crird.nal ~anctions, ng~ncy

statutes .. 52
}>O.t:,sonnul

ar~

{:!rohibitead frotu rec"ttiving COllitp.ensntion, d.1-

;;ect.ly or indirectly, for
Griy ~"4tt~u:

in

of ethics

vhiot'l is

l·Ut.a i~ropoaed

probl~a,

'this

co4~

as the principal

tb~

ei.~lo~~unt,

flUQ!10~..

tbe

t~eana

Q.ep~rt~mtal

A ;'.!ilta:tut.ory eode

to oopc

t.Ai th

cod.C$ to de.t11.l

~1th

problQt;: in .each stat.'il1 and local agency.

prohibits et.at.e ana local aqenoy eJ:l'lployeau from uae

of official posit.ion to
ot.hor

r~nd~1red

renaered or to b1ii\

t.b.at auenc.ty. •53

b~fore

suppl.e..."Wtnt.Qd by

tb.e. paculiariti\;$ of
Thin

.wonie~a

th.a

or gifts

~intJ

~cu J~rC'lf

No

s~~cu.re

Advantages, and fro11l acc&pt.1nu

·•t~hat.

of detJis!oru!f.

cooe ..z.n:e of

1.nter~uit

State off.teer,

mau~on®ly

rd.$iht
~o

tend t.o in•

other proviaions of

in this regard.,

e~loyflto

or

1$p~1ointee

'l'h~y

uet

tshou1d

41)ngaSJ~ in a cou:rse of cont1.ltct which. t'Ai'tfh.t c:.rcatt~
~ t:"QUonabl~ 1t11'.)%'0Sf»ion nmu9 t.h~ :pt(hlie tha.t he

ia. likely to be engayed in act!l t.hlit ar0 in Vi<>lation of l'Lis tr,.111t.

RU1es of conduet adQtlted pursu3nt to tb~ff~ prineipltui should ra®';;ln1~·$, ... • th3t. citim:Qtui ~ho serve
in govern~mt ca.nnot ~d should. not bG &h"Pect0d to
ho wit.bout pet'£Jonal inter01it • • • 1 that cit.i~eng who
aN vowrnment. off.tcial~ ant:1 4U':l;~loyee$ havtf a right
t.o private interest. of

p~rsonal,,

financial and e.oo-

nomic nature; that standards of conduct sho~ld
separate those confllot.$ of int.J?.rc3t. which ~.~tt una.void•
nbla in a free society from these conflict.a cif int~r~ot.
vhich arfi substtantial and matnrial, o.1!" which brinq tbe
govnrnF.ent lnto disrepute. 54
;:a

I

ti. tff

It

t:'

lli~t:

'J

1¢ A

1 '1 l

pJ:inciple$ which eboµld guide any endoavor to effeot zu11me•
!J.'hat. th(ily provide no definitive assistaiioe to the

Qi.es.

. ju.d~nt proouuui in individual sit.untie.ms ia 4PtlU9nt.
provi4~ ade<1u~tc

thfly can

body may be guided in itt.t
An

anforoemn.t

~ch£mism.

BU.~

standards by which au.1 inwsti9atitlg

exploration ot a aase heforfi it.
almoet identical t.o that of i'Jev Yo.l'lt

Mi.nnosot1t undertook a st.udy of aonfl1ct of intet"sat.
t11ro\i9l1 a covt.lr:ior'u

Co~itt.lllte

on Etbica in Goviarrunmnt.

Thia

Committee's reool1lt"l(m<lationa 55 on appllltiUran®s bafor~ s·tato and
1ooal. a.genoies and

form of

011 iuflu.en~ ~ene.tAlly w~re ~d•

broa\d code q.f etb.tcs

fl

~hioh

wu

l.at~r

in the

onacbl;d by the

l&)11$la.~u.r~. 56 1'ha aommitte~, hQwQver, did not rcco~nd &ny
.apacific amct.ions to l.\Ocoapany itli code.

It did ur9e

·tha~

th$ ®de be Q!1acted "'-•1th 3ppropriate sanoUons• but 1t. did

not. try to offer an:t guidani:e as to what: uanotio.na Wt)t:e appropriato for ctu:ta.ts1 activities. 51 ~ha ooi~t.t@e•s re11ort de•
cl.~da

"'A va.riet.y of m~tboas and approacb~s \rill probably

b\l neadad..

Bnforoar:.ent by crlrAinal proo«u1s and

punisb~nt

should be the v;iu~y last re$o.l't. but it should be available. • 58
u

! ' - ...._'

; ••'

.' ..........

sslit$;r;t, Minnesota Governor's Committee on Ethics in
GovernmenEt."' r>aulr Stat~ Print Shop, 1!:)59).
56Minn. :t,.aws (1961), Section 16, Par. 14.

57Report., Minn., 20.

-

58 Ibid., ll.

The
achieve

lrti.nn~sot.a coo~

•:ap~oial

privileges"

~nd

from having any
~ss

of posit.ion to

'the nl!ceit)t of g:ifu or

\at:lltui.tit9s from smu:<..""es other than
with in.iblio duties.

th~ us~

would bar

th~ nt.a't~

in ctmnEJat.1'»1

It alao would iu:ohibit a public offiotal

intar~et

or transactionu or

or ubli9at:.!ons, or

tlrOfil'a~s1onal

a:ctivi t.y

intob,~li!' di~oharga

lie int:.er~at,.. • 59

The, ¢ode include9 tha ~nnd~to that•

!:lie head of $aoh

st~ta

.ta. in

"w~ich

conflict ld.t.b t.be

of llis

in busi•

6*ngagi~g

<tut.i~s

agency should

,in the

p~

p\Abli~h

fer th~ guidance of itu officers and e~loye$e
a cod~ of . puhli.c eervic~ ttthica ap,r,l:topr.:1.at.e to
t:.ha mp~cifie n~eds

ot

each such a9enQ.l"•60

With ·tJmise provi®iona, the eom>:iU:.tea trir.Es to

qenaral.

t"roblar~

d~$l

'tt!t.b tbe

of 1ntluenoa and con,luot.

The pt<obli3m of a~:iit:>ecu:anceti'l b~to::e 3tate a9'er~cios is
ap~roac..."led

W4.l.t'$ urged.,
employ~elti

Two out.right. prohihiti.ons

t-11 b"'l mot>e precision.

'?he first wottl¢l bllr both

f ror~ acting as agent

o~

legislator~ ~nd

ayency

attorney in th{! pros.aaution

<:>f claimi::t ot."l~r than the r~~rformance of bis o.ff ioia.1 dat.ie111;. 61

The

s~cond

r,rohibi t1on !a

ei~n.t l&:r

to tha.t.

encount.ar~d

Jor:.u:ry 1 but t.'11 <t..h M ir:-4Paot: nolely Ul?On liagislato:rs.

in liew
Thi•

propoaal ,,n'I t
Ho le9'i.$lator should accupt any ernploymt·mt
far at"veeranctus bf!llforo My statt>
board o:t' agency. l:nquir.y tor ix1fo~ti.on on
btlhalt of a conatitu~nt may wit?t propriety be

or

rErta.in~t

St
. Ibid. t 33.

-

' 0 ntnnesota La~1s, (1961), Pa.r., 111.

61Ibld.,
...._..,._, Petr., 11 •

aadu, but no fe~ 1 ~:!ft pr favor obould he ac...
c~pted tb.oreforo, either directly or imU.rectl.y. 62

The onlr OQmment. tluat can be aade about t.heae propoau1lt1
is that tJie fU.t=st group ehoula encow\t.er little e:ritioisxn, but
t'.he second ia perhaps more vulner&ble than the ainila3:' flew

ln aMi tion tho tact that appc.uutanoes

Ja1usoy v.ro11osition.
befo~

at.a.te

a~ru.~iea

constitute! an alrJtOSt

1ns~pa~able

of oth¢tr ata.tf.? o:ff1oiale fr()m the p:r:ohibltton fltt.td.kes
aerwlt' as tt:uly dincrind.. natin~ again$'.\!!

t~te

phase

ar~

l.e9!s.lator.

oh-

The

limi tat.ion ut:>on prosecution of cln1rnt1 agid.1u1t the auto would

not. have tlHJ

ir~paot

that th& proh!hi tion a1l)'a1nst appearances

be.fo:r:e state

a~ncies

conatitut.-e an altaest inf!eparllJ.ble pbo.se

of the pr1vat$ law pract.ices of many leq:islators,. t.be

o~s

sion of at.hEn: •tate of fio:L.-1~ fr.om the prohibition strikes
observer as truly diacr:bd.nat..i.n9' a9a:i.nnt. the leqialator •

~n

":he

iitnit.at.ion upO!l pro90cut:Lon of clai• nqa.1nst the at.ate would

not have the iinpact that t.be prohibit.ton
before !lltat:e

fttJt1.nu~ie$'.l

would Ju1,ve. Gl

'fhe

eg~iut iap~arl!inOfaa

la.tt~r

would be ptu.•...

t:;aps too disruptive of private activitea (whioh arG> proha..,..,ly

most often

l.e~itimate)

-nd trd.mtcal to aduquate te91!1lat.1vo

r~~t.ment. 64
62 Ibid.,
·.. '

var.,

20.

6 3ul\'.~P(~:r..s,, Minn. , l 3 a.

' 4&iGcnberg, "Co.nfliet. of Int:.er~st," GS!J.

~-

f.ia:-st. area of aonflict, ai tuat.ions f!bat will b111t

4iscuasod ia th.at which devBlops

~1th

:reyaxd

and legislati v14 etQ.ploy(les partiaul.tlrly • 1
t..:10 cituations

r~nt.ioned

~lati ve ~loycGs,
};~

those in which

of oanflict.s at

l<UUlil

ot.h@r

lo.9i-

ager.icy officials fiu.d

thcn~~alves.

wit:i a.11 aspoet# of the ltlgial•tiv.s: titide

int.\Ur~st

empl.oy~1d,

9oviim~~l:t

~nd

of circw-;..-wt.anoe:u than

n<iYire11 sepnrata wcnni<'iUC!l

J:esult of the principle of separation of powf.uta.

statutes., if

soma: of

otbara in wbich they flJ.a:y

diffe&r~ne £J(!lt.

~uteC"Jt.iV@

Gon~ra11y, d~a.U.n9

Althouqt·•

above llffact. leqi.alntora

tbfu:e arm

involvsd undQt' a far

to l~gialat.ors

can ewn:ace leg-isl.a.to.rs aa

fl«iu:aonnel.

a.lf.I ~·

Crirtdnal
W-tJll

.ns

nut no 0th.er 8.im.otion short of

criminal proaoout.to.ri oan be invoked against legislators by
4'.ly zi.'lt.Um$ or Agency
1atur~a tJiO~utasa
- U ••• ....., .., 'ti:i

other thiUl t.be le9ird.at.ive body. 1

clear au.tl'.10.ri ty ·to

~"lk~

Leti••

rulea 90verning t.he1r:

.-.,_1,.,.., 1 •n 1·"fi<j11RW.,·•..,..

l~hc term •1t!!~ialati w e~l.Oj*'ees• r.ef'ers t:.o tboGC) pe~
oons directly ~oeounti1ble to th0 l~qinlat:or who at ti~as act.
in t.b.~ naw~ or in ploc~ of the leqisle.tor, e.q., St.&ff

A111listants11
2aieen~r~h •confliat of Interest,• 698.
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men'.bership.

No one can threaten a legislator with dismissal

from office except the legislature itself. 3
are difficult to

:.~mploy

Criminal statutes

when dealinq with. legislators because

it is extremely hard to differentiate :between activities that

are an appropriate phase of a legislator's job and those which
90 beyond acceptable conduct and cause personal gain.
the distinction is merely one of emphasis.

Often

This problem is

particularly acute in the area of the use of influence. 4

For

example, a.a essential phase of a legislator's role is to repre•
sent his constituency and to oblige his constituents.

He must

often contact an executive agency on behalf of a decision,
or cut through red tape in order to expedite the handling of
a particular matter.
lator is great.

The demand for such action by a leg-is-

Yet, it can ba appreciated that any of these

aots if pushed with sufficient emphasis or threats could
coiurtitute the use of influence to obtain favorable or unequal
treatment by a government. agancy. 5

To further complicate the

matter, a request for information by a key legislator could,
without intention on his part, be converted into favorable
treatment by a sensitive government agenc,:y. 6

3Ibid., 699. An exception of course is the recall procedure which is possible in some states. Wein9rod, "Patrons,
Patrona9e,• 400.
4weingrod, '*Patrons, Patronage," 492.
5araibantic, *'Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption,"
108.

6MaKitrick, "The Study of Corruption," 239+
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Other related factors include the need for private
income and assets for legislators and

~'le

implications of

their private activities to their public duties, particularly
in the case of lawyer$.

The legal profession is constantly

involved with aome phase of government and the saturation of
the lawyer-legislator in elected state bodies is replete with
the potential use of influence. 7

The critical problem develops

in effecting a reconciliation of private legal practices and
the public interest.
A.

Federal Legislators

An essential difference must be stressed between the

Congressman and the state le9islator"

Congressmen a.re per-

haps capable of treatm.ent as full-time public officials; 8

state legislators, except in a few cases, are not.

Therefore,

it is only recently that interest in curbing the private

activities of state legislators has had serious reception. 9
The degree of litrdtations placed on state legislators, it

would appear, would have to be less than those available for

nut in terms of conflict legislation there are

Congressmen.

fewer restrictions on the bf:o..havior and activities of Congress•
men

t..~an

on state legislators in states that have acted on

the problem.

10

7weingrod,•Patrons, Patronage,• 496.
8congressional Quarterly Almanac, 72.
9Braibantic, ffRefleotions on Bureaucratic Corruption,•
109.

lOSparke, •conflict of Whose Interest,• 689.

.!10

The action, taken or reCOmh"lended formally, to be

examined in this area is that which seeks to

~et

tho confl!ot

probler.a in the legialat:ivo bra.nail apart from the general traat•
r.ient. of conflicts of interest among agency personnel.

.Most

suoh action occurs in the promulgation of codes of ethios
legislators and legislative

e~~loyees.

fo~

such codes seek to

deal with t.he diffioult., undefinable aspects of conflict of

interest. 11
Congresamen ara subject. to re la ti vcly few liuiJ. tationa

upon their personal activities and interests.

They are pro-

hibited from practicing befor@. the Uni.tatl States Court. of
Claim..'$ but otherwise rerea.in
pri vats aoti vi ti as. 12

ra.th~r

unrestricted in tt1ei:r

After lonq p:res~nu:e

the Con.qress did

approve a concurrent resoluti<.m that set forth a •code of

Ethics for Government Sarviee.• 13
to •any person in

Govorm~tent

Intend~d to be ~pplicable

Serv.ice,• thQ code taight be in-

terpreted ea iroll to con"'.tey the aanse of Congress relative
to the behavior of its m-m roombership.

extremely )Je11eral

stat.em~m.ts

The codg contains

of standards of behavior•

It

calls for loyalty to eountr"] and "highest moral principles•
abov~

all other loyalties, and dadi.oat:!.011 to the cons ti tut.ion

an.d the lt£ws of the Unit.ad States. 14

It deolaret!J that public

officials and emt:>loyeetJ should •giva a full dray• s labor for

121s

u.s.c., sea.,

282, (1952).

l3a • .R. con. nes. 17.S, BSth Cong • .2nd Seea. (1958).
1 441

u.s.c.,

S~a., 126 (1959).
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a fu.ll day's pay" and sasi' t.o accomplish their tasks cd:fi ...
an~l

ciently

our oon<:el.."fi is for proviid.ons tw.re

acouom.tcal.l)'•

directly related to zituations of conflict of int1l;l;reat. bow•
In this .ragard tl1e coda

&var~

~OViH:"nmi.lnt

the

OJ:

for

of special :favou-;; or

rt:~muneration

his :family, favors

rnigbt oo

th.at .a peruon tn

n-tarvice should not ". • • d1$Ct"itninate. unfai.rly by

di~1)~uisii1q

uh.~t.hez-

d~clares

con~t.rued

oit

privil~ig(i.\a

to anyone,

or not; and never acaopt, tot: hi:taselt
b.:mefit.$ und'14r

circumatano,~e ~i1ich

by roa.$<.mable pf$raon$ as

influ~noin9

the

~u:formana(l of lti~ government.al duti.os.• 15 ln additiozi prt•
va tii

pro~d.ae.s at'~

du.tie~

of of11ce..

th~ ~ov£u:nnient,
ccn1si~t.@n.t

t;1,f!J

~he

-

should

11 e1ig11191J

in no bu.id.•"'less with

well,

Confioentinl Jsiforrl..!ltion is not to he ua~d

t.'Wl"d.l'.HJ

i;i:-ivata profit. ... • 11

·~~t1oae corruption

concurnmt

r~$olution

lS Ibid., Par., 2 •

-

h~

with the or,msu:ien:it.ious pelt'.forxr.nno-0 of his qov<arn•

a i:ooani;a for

shi:::n1ldt

Aliso

that are hi.ndin.g upon th-a

h~ hiadia

either '1.irectl:t or indirGctly, which is in•

%1~ntn1. duti~11J. 016
•titl

no·t. to

lSibid., :Par., 4.

A public servant.

Wbtlumvli!r

tliscov~rtiid.. • 18

et:abruai:1g tbia code of

view of Congreos on the su.bjoct.

Congress itself as a 9uide to

the~

It might be eruployed by

behavior of its members or

emi1loyees. should Congress choose to exercise it.

It. can per-

haps act a.0 the standard by which Congress oould cen.sure its
~embers

or disciplin$ its employees.

nut there is no con1.pul•

sion for thelil to so employ it.. 19 While it could employ the
code on an ad hoc basis Congress rdg.h.t have embraced 1 ts rules

in liJome form and provided a rooaniJ of enforcement. 20

this

w~s

Of courae,-

not done, and t.be real impact of tho code is slight

indeed. 21

Xt contains no provision for enforcez..ient and no

direct statement of its applicability to Congress it.self or

any impl.t.ca.tion·toward. the stiates. 22

Its were adopt.ion, how-

ever, could be of si9nificai1ce, since previous efforts to $e-

cura any other action by Congress on the subject failed. 23

n.
New York

St.ate Legislators

reco~'Uized

tlia need for distinct

tI.~eatment

of

·the le9islative side of oonflicta of intE:rast, especially in

19 Ibid.,
..
Par., 1 o.

20 Potentially, of course, Congress does have such measures as Ethics Committees and Party Causes which have enforcement f!lftans.

2lPeroy, tt'I'ha Crisis of Public '!'rust,• J4.

22aeeent non-statutory effort.a at reform have includ$d

reports by various Nader Comnrl.. t.tees and by Common Ca.us~.

23.fzimenberg, •conflict of Intereat," 672.
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.ro-gtu:·d to '1!nforc11.unitlnt of it.a eod~ of i.!!t-hics.. 24

At t.he sar.1in

ti??..m that ita oonfl!ats 1:1tatutas were adopted, ~ac.h housQ
of tl'.ri! 14ew York l~gi'1ln:tur~1 cri)~ted a Cotnr.d tt.e~
~lfJ eo~mtt.~e.s

GuldMec.
r~m.tivf.n~

ware 91.ven

th~

oii Ethic~

and

reapons!b1.lity for

.r:u·i4"l i.n"ittH:itiqating cornplaint$ an<l charge$ aqnimst

1u9tlitl.a:t.orf.t or lagi.3lat1ve ernplo;1ooa for
Find.tnsrs and

Nf.t\<t York co;fle.

~pp2!'opr1ate

l'ort.ed to tbia
mit:tec~ '1'ter~

violation~

r<:H::ol'!'~<),:ndation8 var~

la.1i1-enf'o:reeime11t ag-enoy.

of thct

to

1~ r~

Tho

co~

also authoz-ized to ren<for advice, upor1 roquest,

cc.mo1.;u:nb'.\9 potttli.hla violat,ione of
t.inleudt\l!.Ut.t$ to

t..~e

<:ode

th~

cod.a and to

~ecot"ll.~en4

or t.o e.>iia·tin~ law. 25

\'l'l.E.11 ~ii~w York system. of handling the legislative prob•

leta p:rov1dt1s a
.h~vio~ ~re

while

~ans

orit~ria

for legislative bisa-

avaJ.lable and imforoen.wmt may bt' aeaomplished

pt'e:il~rvinq

ooflimrs tuld

·w<he.;;rat>y

tho leyislature's

u~1~l(>fE!es •. Ultii1,1nt~

prero~at.iven

ovet" their

responsibilit.y still li$S

with tlw l09!$lature it.self, however, for thfl succes!.l of

th*l t1ystel'ti.

nut for~lly presentad compla.ints will b~ ratbo:r:

difficult for th:e comttitteas to ignore or ratti<>n~li&e away.:Ui

')4
....
Scott., •corrup:t.lon,
C~:u.i:i.n.9@ , u

216 •

~§':t.hesifj eommi.tble.li are astabli.$luii:d amlQa.lly by .reaolu•
!~tgislatue.
For o:t&ttple, 1n 1967
t..:'1@ poi:Unant.:. resolutions wet'e s.!t. 145 ~nd A.R. lS!G.

t.ton of 0ach h<>use of the
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This New York system has served as a model for proposals
put forth in New Jersey on this aspect of the problem.
The New Jersey report urged the adoption of a supplement to the rules of each legislative chambar. 27

This sup-

plement would embrace a code of ethics applicable to t.'1.e

membership and employees of each house.

Among the proposed

provisions of the oode are prohibitions upon personal interest
or activities in conflict with the "proper discharge" of
c.luties in the "public interest," use of official position to

secure "unwarranted" privileges, lobbying activities, receipt
of gifts or favors that "might reasonably tend to influence"
a legislator's behavior, and the disclosure or use of confidential information.,
Jersey Commission

For enforcement of the code of New

recor~i.m.ended

mittees in each house. 28

the creation of standing com-

The function of such committees

would be approximately the same as those of the legislative
committees in Hew York.

The Commission's recoror..iendation

were not adopted by both houses of the New Jersey legislature
at the time of their submission.

-

28 Ibid., 33.

In 1958 a code d ethics was
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ad&.td to tll¢i

li!i'.#W

Jaarsey GenEJral A•aembly Code of Etbica ~

a lo~islatiVll 00:<1."Utt.e0 waii cstablish0d as 1u1 enfol:'ollimwnt

vehicl~. 2 '
Minnelrlot.a, Texas, and. Georgia did not prov1c1e or l'eaor.i- .

mol'1.d sepiu:at.tJ cod.es of et!:d.es or enforcetu"ent systems toi:
legis.l.ators.

tu. l9GO, a aod0 of leqi.alativo etllics was draft•

«4 by a New ~~xi.co L~gislatiw cow:icil cot~itt.~e. 36

had t.'1e appearance of being o. leglalator's

ha.v.t.or.

11

~bis eode

pl0d.gi.t• of be•

lt was stated in very 94tne:tal terrm that. would he

difficult. to apply to concrcte oitua.tions.

A significant

ptovu.t.on was fo:: t.iwi f!linq of a statement of sou.tatts of compoiltHtt.ion by legialatorn wbere 1 t.
l!le~e

Di>1~c1.u:ed

that such so\U!'cas

d!a:eotly concarned in mat.tors bf.iforu the lQg:i.slat.ure.

N<ew Me>Uco clao called for a lflgialAtor to pled9e to vote to
cenin.u:o or e~l .fl member who violated the studa:r~ .• 31
A tinal.

00~11t. ~ut

lt,gislative conflict. of intet'eRt

iaut. be made, for it. cc:meorns a preei.se arEia 1n whicb un•
1191:e~ment

animous

ex.tats.

All. reports and auoi)ted coaen .in•

cludu the i)rtu1cription that leuial.atora ar'3 not to vote Ul)On

29u • .;r. Laws, 19~9, c. 94, P~u:·., r;. At the 1958 soas1on
of the N.J. oeneral Assembly, a resolution e1nbodyin9 sue~ a

supple•nt to the rulea wa• adopted and a 1Ggialative comittee
11ru
eutabliabe4. Fro. 1959-1969, tnr~o oases were beard ancl
dJ.o~1esed b~oaus1tt of insuffioient eviafl?u:e. ~Tobn A. Gardner,
'i:h• Politic& of cyrf~li9fl.. ....9;L~!!".!f. ~~!=,~ ·~h~!i~~
~-'t:l!_ fi~ew' 'forki•'
&g'a ·
at on,
tUUSQ

OW\

J..';;j

,

.

.,

30m,w Ji~xi.ao ~CJi•lat.l ve Comi t.tee" !!!":..~~~. '1~!'!. 9,~•.~!!.•
!~.,~.,-• ,1;1~1cp,,, s.a. 326, lSGl* (Adopbiad) •

.

3l1~ew. Ha~oc .Laws, ·1961, c. 4~, Pa~.,

s.

st.a~nt

of such in:tera:st i$l required to b-e n'i.Ude tietrt of

tha letfialati vo juurrial. 32

~hlo.~ prohi.b! tion is not

in th$ rt.llalG of leginlati VG

ho'1i~m

~dre1S1n>~nt.

11,.

to be fott."td with

U~tl

m4d

tlial:~

:prineii)le.

33

uneowri01'l

is li ttl!!;l eiaa ...

CH.APTER IV

PERSONAL INTEREST
A second broad area of conflict of interest situations

stems from the principle that public of fioials should not
have a personal interest in the business transactions in whic:::h
they are engaged for governmant, nor should they exploit their
influence or acquaintaiices with persons who conduct such

transactions so that businesses in which they have a perscmal interest are benefited.

Persons who have interests in

business activities subject to state regulation may sindlarly
be in a position to profit from f<.lVorable treatment made pos•

sible either by their direct participation in the regulatory
process or by their access to or influence with the actual
regulators.

This last situation is more subtle and difficult

to tretlt than the more overt situations of negotiating with
Mal;ing contract awards on behalf of government to

oneself.

one•s own firm is cor.uuonly considered reproachable, as is
perhaps regulating one•s own business. 1

1paul a. Appleby, Morality and Administration in
Democratic Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963),

192.

.

-
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The difficulty in this area, however, lies in determining the extent of personal interest in such business enterprises that potentially would be harmful to the public interest. 2
In contemporary society, personal interest in business enter-

prises, more often than not, consists of a partnership arrangement, ownership by a close relative, or ownership of stock in
corporations.

Stock ownership in particular has proven to be

a confusing problem.

one of the best examples of the dilemma

that can arise was that presented by former Defense Secretary
Charles E. Wilson and his huge stock holdinqs in General
Motors Corporation. 3 Although he disposed of the stock in this
situation, the matter was far from beinq settled by followinq
that precedent.

'l'he fear in the Wilson situation was that

his position in the administrative hierarchy of a department
with which his former company had so many business relations
might affect the decisions of contract negotiators. 4

Yet

not all government officials own stock in the quantities that
Secretary Wilson had nor do they have his background of cor. porate executive experience.

But stock ownership is common

in the United St.ates today and it may be presumed that there
are certain stocks which almost every person with an adequately

-

2Ibid., 183,

3tbid. 1 195.

-

4Ibid., 196.
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diversified portfolio possesses. 5

Therefore, the essential

question becomes that of ascertaining how much stock ownership in any enterprise may jeopardize the public interest.
Newly sworn in Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell chose to
divest himself of all his stock interests so as not to jeopardize the public interest. 6 Another perplexing facet is how
close a relative must the owner be for there to be grounds
for suspecting that oonttaot awards may be made on other than
the merits of a case.

or, how are partnerships to be severed

when one party temporarily enters government employment?

And

finally, and certainly not very much less important, what of
relations that

devt~lop

in the area one step removed from

direct connection with government business or regulation?

If

personal interest. is held by a public official in a firm which

sells to another firm that is regulated

by

government or seeks

government contracts, ·there may well be grounds for suspectinq a conflict of interests, especially if the official has
th• .responsibility lbr the t'&9'\lla.tion of the second firm or the

award of contracts to it.

5Donald J. Kingsley, Representative Democracy;
(Cambridqes Harvard University Press, 1955), 211.
6New York Times, Nov. 15 (4) 1971.
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A.

overt Situations

Consideration of situations of this kind have occupied
government in the United States and brought forth various

remedies in law and in proposed laws.

Criminal statutes

ex.tat to prohibit.the mostovert.,m.anifestations and codes of
ethics have been employed or.su9gested to cover the other
subtle forms. 7 · Attempts have been made to define. personal

interest that should be appropriately regulated •. They have
included the broad concept of •an interest,• •controlling

interest,• and the definition of a certain percentage of
stock ownership in any one coi:poration. 8

A publicity device

has also been used. whereby the pertinent. financial interests
of certain offict.als would be .declared and in most caaes
made available to the public. 9 But no one rexnedy has
been found satisfactory, although proposals on the subject
•re almost legion. · The states, pa.t'tioularly, have enacted

or proposed.solutiona. that qenerally vary with the extent of
the incidence of the problem in the state.and the reception
of responsible.officials to the praQticability of the various

?Eisenberg, •conflict of Interest,• 669.
8Braibanti, •aefleetions on Bureaucratic Corruption,•
106~

of,

9Robert s •.. Get.a 1 ConSf!essional ~thios 1 . The Conflict ·
Interest ?tu1u@ (New York• Van Nostrand, 1966), . 166.
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approaches to coping with all of these dilemmas.

The only

common method that is apparent in the code of ethics is to
promulgate acceptable behavior in this area rather than to
employ a series of criminal statutes to prohibit many specifically defined situations., 10
There have been many proposals to establish a system
of publicizing the personal financial interests of federal

and state government officials through a reporting procedure
with the information so fathered available for public inspeotion.11

No proposal of this sort has yet met with any suc-

cess • 12 · Publicity as a solution recognizes the difficulty

of defining proper and inproper situations and seeks merely
to collect relevant information and allow the publio to be

lOAll fifty states have some kind of legal code of
ethics1 for a complete breakdown see, J. o. Millett,
Government andl?ublio Administration:. The Quest for
Responslb'i'.e Perlormanoe (New York: colum&Ia university
Press, l941J, 492-:.1 For a more cecent and briefer analysis
see, Bayless Manninq, "The Purty Potlatch: An Essay on
Conflict of Interest, American Government, and Moral
Escalation,• Feder~l Bar Journal, 24:3, Summer, 1964.

11:sraibanti, •neflections on Bureaucratic Corruption,•

107.
12 aecently the organization, Common Cause has begun
a campa:dgn monitoring project which may be very similar to a
program needed in the financial interest area. For a complete
description see, The Cotnlt\Qn.Cause Manual on Money and Politics
(Washington

o.c.: ·

common Cause, 197~).
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the judge of what is proper in the particular instance.

It

also endeavors to place the public official in the position
of deciding for himself what the effects of his known in•
terests will be, and to make adjustments and bear

responsi~

bility accordingly. 13
B.

Less Apparent Situations
1

The state of G$orgia'a approach to personal interest

in business takes the form of criminal statutes that define
unacceptable behavior for public officials.

They describe

both overt circumstances and less apparent but' related situations.

Many of the provisions are unique in comparison to

the usual solutions and descriptions encountered.elsewhere.
All state officials and employees who receive some form of
compensation from the state, including per diem fees, are
prohibited from selling any goods or merchandise to the state
or any

11tat.e

entity. 14

agency on behalf of themselves or any business

It is not com.pletely clear whether this prohibi•

tion is merely applicable to the direct act of sellinq to
the state by such a person of the same business entity who
sells to the st.ate.

'l'his would appear to be the case, .in

which. event only the direct participation of state officials
in such transactions is barred, and then only if the official

13araibanti, •Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption,•
122.
14aa. Lcws, 1959, c.24, Par,, l.
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acts as salesman. 15

The provision apparently would not

apply to officials transacting business for the state with
representatives of a firm in which the official had a private
interest.

Georgia also prohibits the making of false state-

ments by either state officials or sellers to the st.ate relative to material, labor, or costs, and also bans false representations conce:rninq material, labor, or costs with intent
to defraud the state. 16

In addition, Georgia declares that

contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade or of "free
and open competition" in transactions with the state are
illegat. 17 · Violations of any of these sections are considered

as felonies punishable, upon conviction {as other violations
cited above), by imprisonment from one to twenty years.

It

should be pointed out that the somewhat peculiar orientation
of Georgia's treatment of contracts is attributable to

alleged scandals in that state in

thi~

area which precipitated

the interest in conflicts laws in the first place, 18 No
legislation was enacted to meet other rGAmifications of the
problem.

15.aisenberq, "Conflict of Interest," 696.
1 6Ga. Laws, 1959, c.24, Par.,

s.

1 7Ga., Laws, 1959, c.24, Par., 6 •
•

l8A. J. Heidenheimer, Political CorruEtion (New Yorkt
Holt Rinehart Winston, 1970), !o2.
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c.

Selected State Examples
l.

New York

New York's action in the area of private business

interests and potential conflicts of interest that develop
therefrom reveals a concern with broader and more subtle

ramifications of the problem.

Generally, New York deals with

the problem in its code of ethics, but criminal sanctions
are also employed to meet a varieti' of the circumstances in
this area.

New York. requires 001npeti ti ve bidding before

contracts exceeding twenty-five dollars can be awarded. to

firms in which state officials have ten percent or more interest in stock.

~he

requirement is set forth as followsa

No officer or employee of a state agency,
member of the legislature, • • • shall sell any
goods or services having a value in excess of
twenty-five dollars to any state agency unless
pursuant to an award or contract set after
public notice and competitive bidding.19

Violations of thie provision are to be treated as mis-

(lemeanors. 26 There are two significant aspects of this New
York law.

The first is the prescription that ownership of

ten percent or more of the stock in a corporation constitutes
sufficient interest to create a potential conflict of interest

situation requirinq statutory attention.

There have been

other proposals to define personal interest as reflected in

19N. Y. Public Officers Law, See., 73, Par., 3.

-

20Ibid., Par., 8.
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stock ownership for the iJUrpose of determining when a potentiality of a conflict of interest exists.

Some urge
'

20 percent of stock ovmership as the critical point; others
propose lesser percentage figures for this purpose. 21

New

York's definition of 10 percent is one of the few percentage
figures to a·chieve enactment. 22

The second aspect of the

Empire State's efforts in this law is the requirement for
competitive bidding which it establishes.

By not providing

an outright prohibition of business transactions with the
state which infers that situations of this kin.• are funda-

mentally unsound. for the public interest, it reflects only
the potentiality of such a clash of interests. 23

Instead of

prohibition, public competitive bidding is to be the means
whereby equal treatment of all desirous sellers may be
accomplished.

Placing the amount of affected contracts at

twenty-five dollars i.s further assurance of such equal treat-

ment. 24

It should be noted that the requirement of bidding

2lchicago, University Law School, •conference on Con•
flict of Interest,• February 20, 1961, Chicago, iii, 100,
Series 1'30. 15.

22N. Y. Public Officers Law, Sec., 74, Par., 11.

23Thomas R. Dye, •oifferentiation and Cooperation in a
Metropolitan Area,• Midwest Journal of Political Science,
(May, 1963) 1 127.
24 Ibid., 134.
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rat.her th.an £)robibitio."l ia sn:efara.hle to ooat. situations
in whia.,11 there may be oul.y one 1'nown available uupplier of

e. cotun0dity or ::lervice. 25
in which a
~d

ver~onal ·.int1are~·t

wh.!eh yet.

be foolish.

oould w-all
unit~

To uan transact.ions with tiri:ruJ

a~~

exint~

of a public official

often the sOlQ (iUpplie.ra i.n an area would
Yori~

The l'iew
t-~rovid.e

approach on tbia i)oint ia one that

a moael for other atat.os

inti.ta.rented in

A

po4\laibltJ

an.&w~r

or goverxunental

t.o this phase of tbe

conflicts ptoblet'l. 26
1fhe maw

Yorl~

code of ethics contains

deal1n9 '4it.io'l contract&l or ir1terests in
T'Mt-Q

u~

g-in1fi:tnll1r

$U1.n~ta.nce

of t.b.e

p!~rased

u~vera.l

busin~ss

parai;:rapl'u1

t.rc.nsactions.

with much. room for interpretati.on

in volvad in each s1 t.uat.ion.

~be:t

eleaborate

tho princ;iplo tbnt public otficials should not have a prJ....
vcttJ interest that. might. conflic·t vith ttuair public dut.io•

and t:ttsponsibilities.
ood@ of

~tbi.c~ h~s

7be vorclinq of these port.ions of the

'been closely followed by other states t.i;y•

ing to solve t.be probl~~. 27

u
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t.hey ara :represtmtat.ive of mimil•r lewtslation

ea

pro-

pottals in ot.het' $tates .nient:ion(:Jd below.

2 'J~u

c. Scott, •corruption, »aah.ine Politics and.
Socto1 Chafe,• 70.
26Bit1tH1ber9, •conflict. of IntQr<tst.,• 6Sfi.

21soott, •cor~ption,• 72.
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stat1dards of the code would be established.

The person in-

volved would then be either disciplined or entirely cleared
of the oharge. 30

Another provision of the Maw York code of ethics petta!ns ·to the same problem of personal· interest 1-lthough somewhat merged with that of influence-wielding.

It utilizes

publicity of personal interest in businesses subject to state
regulation.

The code provides that state officials, legis-

lators, and legislative employees who have a direct or indi-

rect. financial interest of at least $10 1 000 in·•any activity
which is subject to the jurisdiction of a rag'Ulatory agency"'
should fila written statements of such interest with the

Secretary of State. 31
publio inspection.

Such statements would be open to

Although the publicity approach is briefly

discussed earlier in relation to th.e federal government, it
is appropriate to explore some of the perplexing facets about
it

as this point since New York employs it.

The efficacy of

publicity as a remedy to conflict situations is thought to
lie in the deterrent effect that filing statements of finan•

cial interest in various activities and having them available
to the public has upon the behavior of persons who might be
tempted to seek favorable treatment.

It is thought that

30scott, .•~orruption,• 72.

31N. y. Public Officers Law, .Sec., 74, Par., 4.
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affected pernorrn would hesitate to influon-oo act.ion if the

public could so oasily be
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the e~d.f&tenc:c of financial interest:. 32
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in wbic;ll th@ private financial si tuation!I of public
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In this respeot, one need

point. only 'to the disclosure of tho personal financial in-

tenats of presidential candidates in 1968 and 1972.
-·

,.

14'.1 t

~......

'"'"

32RObort

.aut

tli<t

s.

Preaf.1 1 lflf2), .47.
33Xh.\4.• , 52.

Lane, Political Ideology {Nev Yorkt

Free
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that affected political candidates already in the heat of
electioneering and not career or high-level officials who

might be less prone to rnaka such disclosure.

Certainly the

mass of citizens in the United States value the confidential
nature of th.e;r federal income tax returns.

It is difficult

to conceive of much enthusiasm for having such data e>.."Posed.
There is certainly a price to be paid for political activity

insofar as privacy is concerned, but how great must this pttce
be?

Anc1 what of the non-political career public servant?

2.

Texas

The Texas code of ethies contains several provisions
dealing with transactions of the state. 34

tt approaches the

problem by making its prohibitions applicable to firms in

which state officials or legislators have a •controlling
interest.•

Tb.e code declares that an official or employee

of a state agency is not to transact business in his official
capacity with business entities in which he is an officer,
agent, member, or in which be owns a controlling interest.
Similarly·such an official and the firms in which he has an
interest are not to sell qoods or services to firms or cor•
t;JOrti.tions which are either licensed or regulated lly the state
agency in which such official is employed. 35

:Publicity is

34'I'exas Laws, 1957, c.100, Seo., 3, Par., 4,.
35 Ibid., Par.,
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of inte:rcuit. 3 '
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lnclu~

st~t.ute1.
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t..~e

..t~10

B-.J. s.U~uat.ion (Chapte:: llt• footnote 29) •u99t1u1ts
pos$1bi11ty of such. a circumv.nt.ioA •l•o happe1d.n9 at tllo
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alause wbereby inf ormat.ion would be made available to public
representatives.

It is hoped that such a conflict of in-

terest statue would be reviewed periodically by Con9reps
and would be changed

iiQ.

needed.

There are no •perfect•

solutions to conf liot of interest.

Hopefully a. re-examination

of present statutes and a periodic review of statutes will
decrease t.he temptation to be involved in certain kinds of
situations.
'l'bere seems to be a current trend to non-statutory
responses to possible conflict situations.

Such public in-

terest groups as Ralph Nader committees alld Common Cause
attempt to present an economic profile of legislators at the
_national level of government. 7

'rhese profiles could serve

as a basis for elect.roal Cleoisions. 8

However, these public

interest groups have not yet undertaken a complete examina•
tion of appointed national and state administrators.
B.

State Legislation

Althouqh all fifty states have not been examined for
this conflict of interest prosEm.tation some qaneral conclu-,
sions can be made from the info~tion presented. 9

First, it

7see Chapter IV, Footnote 12. Other approaches suoh as
publ1o campaign financing have also been initiated. Watzman,
Conflict of Interest, 176.
8irhis, of course, is the ultimate go~l. It may however,
be aided indirectly through editorial coznment or interest group
membersbip reaction.
·
9This author'$ home state of Virginia has had conflict
proposals initiated in two separate sessions of the State

General Assembly.

See footnote 29, Chapter II.
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pu.blio.

Codes of

i

t

SJ • -

.......

wag~d

by

tho Coman

70

Finally, it is also clear that. conflict of interest
policy has mainly been initiated .in response to specific

conflict situations. 12

Post facto laws typically deal only

witll "closing the :barn door after the horse has run away."

Studies in the conflict area indicate that this is the least
effective way of dealing with conflict of interest policy. 13

However, this seems to be the present course of the national
govemment and th.a state governments.,

12watzman, Conflict.of Interest., 168.
13Percy, "The Crisis of Publio Trust," 14.
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